Tuesday, January 22, 2019

The Unsustainability of Donald Trump’s Immigration and Trade Policies

Two pillars of the Trumpian platform include decrying free-trade agreements Trump perceives as disadvantageous to the United States and an increasingly stringent immigration policy. Amid a chorus of “build the wall” in reference to his proposal to construct a literal wall along the US-Mexican border in an effort to stem the flow of migrants from Mexico and the rest of Latin America are also Trump’s push to ban travel from predominantly Muslim countries (which was only upheld by the courts after North Korea and Venezuela were added to the list of countries suspended from entering the US) and calls to end so-called “chain migration” – a process through which Americans help foreign-born relatives gain citizenship. Scholarship, however, suggests that closed trade and closed borders may not entirely be attainable.

Indeed, in one of his first acts in the White House, Trump signed an executive order that pulled the United States out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free-trade agreement of 12 nations from Asia, North America, South America, Australia, and New Zealand that collectively account for roughly 40% of annual global trade. In updating NAFTA terms with Mexico, Trump had repeatedly threatened to preclude Canada – despite warnings from congressional lawmakers that they would not support any agreement excluding Canada and the opaque legality of doing so – before eventually concluding the tripartite negotiations. Trump has also repeatedly looked into exiting the US from the WTO, claiming the organization is used by other countries to “screw the United States.” Though highly unlikely, the very idea is indicative of Trump’s protectionist attitude towards trade between the US and the rest of the world.

On the other side of Trump’s isolationist agenda is his notorious rally cry to build a wall along the southern border of the US to keep out migrants from Mexico and other Latin American countries. Trump touts that a wall between the US and Mexico is of vital importance to the safety of all Americans and routinely disparages “sanctuary cities” for not cooperating with federal immigration authorities. This belies the fact that studies suggest immigrants commit violent crimes at a substantially lower rate than native-born Americans. Trump’s other resolutions to stem migrant flows to the US also use the security and safety of Americans as justification. His calls for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States” and an end to family-based immigration in response to acts of domestic terror were also in the name of keeping Americans safe.

Research suggests, however, that closed trade and closed borders are not complementary policies that Trump can simultaneously pursue. In her research on trade and migration published in 2014 and 2015, Margaret Peters produced findings that suggest trade policy affects the composition of firms in the economy and their need for low-skilled labor. Protectionist measures such as those pursued by Trump inherently push an economy inward as tariffs and non-tariff barriers increase the price of exports and encourage domestic consumers to purchase locally produced goods and domestic producers with higher costs to enter the market. In other words, trade restrictions result in an increase in production in labor-intensive industries. As Peters notes, this leads to an uptick in the amount of low-skill labor demanded in labor-scarce nations such as the United States as any gains that might be realized from government protectionist measures would be offset by a simultaneous increase in wages. Given that immigrant labor is usually cheaper than native labor (and, as Peters states in her 2015 piece, tend to be low-skilled laborers), firms in response lobby representatives for more generous immigration policies or for subsidies to stay in business. Indeed, Peters’ results show that Congress votes for tighter immigration controls when trade is open and for more lenient controls when trade is restricted. As closed trade leads to an increase in production in labor-intensive industries, business interests have incentives to push for open migration in order to capture the cost benefits of low-skilled foreign workers. The relationship between trade and immigration policies trending in opposite directions is so strong that Peters is able to find evidence dating back to the 1780s. As trade is restricted, borders are open by economic necessity and as trade is liberalized, politicians are less generous with immigration quotas as firms can now offshore their production costs.

What does this mean for Donald Trump? He’s already had to shell out $6 billion in relief to farmers hit hard with retaliatory tariffs from China (which, as Peters points out, is exactly what Alexander Hamilton argued would happen were the US to erect tariffs). Coca-Cola also announced it will need to raise its prices in response to rising aluminum costs as a result of Trump’s tariffs and Harley Davidson has announced plans to move production to Europe in order to avoid retaliatory tariffs. Ford CEO Jim Hackett says that Ford has already lost around $1 billion in profit due to the tariffs while Walmart and Target have stated a planned price hike on their products due to increased input prices as a result of Trump’s tariffs. While it’s plausible Trump could offer financial packages to these companies to offset costs or keep them in the US, the US budget deficit has already increased by 17% this year to $779 billion and more than 70% of Americans have expressed the budget deficit should be a top-three priority, indicating Trump may be fast approaching the ceiling for his bailouts.

If Trump is steadfast on maintaining protectionist measures, then he must be willing to give ground on immigration and refugee restrictions. With a caravan of migrants fleeing poverty and violence making progress to the US border, Trump may be in prime position to offer the US economy relief from his current trade standoffs with other countries. An influx of low-cost, low-skilled workers would provide immediate relief to US industries hit by retaliatory sanctions. If scholars are right, Trump must choose between building a wall against migration and building a wall against international trade. Research suggests that one will have to give in the long run.

Trumping the Border Wall



There are currently nearly 15,000 immigrant children in the custody of the US government. The recent death of a 7-year-old migrant girl in the custody of US border control has brought the caravan of El Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran migrants heading towards the southern border of the United States back into the headlines. The number of migrants is increasing not only because of new guidelines by the Trump administration where everyone in a sponsor’s household may potentially have to undergo a background check (which significantly slows down the processing of these migrants) but also because of deteriorating conditions in the countries these migrants are fleeing.

Trump, for his part, has threatened to seal the 2,000-mile US-Mexican border in order to stem the flow of migrants. He has already deployed over 5,000 active-duty troops to the border and border authorities have also sprayed tear gas to disperse migrants seeking entry into the US. Trump has also threatened to shut down the federal government if congressional Democrats do not approve $5 billion in funding for a wall. The recent death of 20-year-old college student Mollie Tibbets by undocumented migrant Christhian Bahena Rivera has only galvanized Republican support for a wall. Despite all the hawkish bluster and rhetoric, there may be better policy options if the Trump administration is truly concerned about keeping dangerous people out of the United States.

As I wrote in my previous post, research by Margaret Peters (2014, 2015) suggests that dual policies of closed trade and closed borders are not mutually sustainable – one has to give. The majority of the people in these caravans are fleeing both violence and extreme poverty – these are not mutually exclusive phenomena.

Research from Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan (2016) shows that when given the opportunity to engage in legitimate income-generating sectors of the economy, former fighters in Liberia invested more of their time in doing so and less of their time in illicit activities. These licit economic opportunities also reduced interest in seeking employment as a mercenary in ongoing conflict nearby. In other words, Blattman and Annan empirically show that increases in economic opportunities decrease violence.

Eli Berman, Jacob Shapiro, and Joseph Felter (2011) provide similar research. They show that US reconstruction funds in Iraq allocated through the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) reduce violence and has a more significant effect for smaller projects.

What does this have to do with the price of tea in China? The 2018 Fragile States Index rates El Salvador and Honduras with elevated warnings for becoming fragile or failed and Guatemala with a high warning for becoming fragile or failed. This is relevant because an overwhelming number of people in the caravan are fleeing poverty and gang violence. Research from Oriana Bandiera (2003) and Diego Gambetta (1993) suggests that the rise of the Sicilian Mafia came about partially in response to the inability of a weak state to govern. It’s not a stretch to suggest that gang activity is more prominent in areas where there is also a weak state presence with limited economic prospects.

Part of Trump’s solution to the migrant caravan is to cut off aid to the sending states. According to the US Global Leadership Coalition, US aid to these countries have resulted in lifting 68,000 people out of extreme poverty in Honduras, created 20,000 jobs in Guatemala’s agriculture sector, and granted access to electricity for more than 33,000 households in El Salvador. As research referenced above indicates, the presence of economic opportunities can enhance safety and security. Removing these economic programs, particularly in weak states, will in all likelihood exacerbate the situation these migrants are fleeing from and result in an even more massive influx of people along the US-Mexican border. Sanctioning these states by cutting off aid, therefore, will simply make matters worse – not better.

In her book The Taming of Democracy Assistance: Why Democracy Promotion Does Not Confront Dictators, Sarah Bush notes that democracy assistance programs typically advance programs that don’t attempt to change the status quo per se, but rather focus on improving local governance. While her analysis focuses on explaining this phenomenon, her insight is useful in this context as well. If the Trump administration is genuinely concerned about the number of migrants fleeing poverty and violence from El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, the solution isn’t to cut off aid. US policy of the 1990s of deporting violent criminals to central and Latin America essentially exported and expanded MS-13 and Barrio 18, the gangs responsible for large portions of the violence people in the caravan are fleeing to these countries. A more practical solution would be to continue aid, particularly to organizations engaging in smaller, localized development projects as evidence from Iraq indicates that smaller investment projects have a more substantial effect of reducing violence.

The United States has spent roughly $200 million in foreign aid to El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala this year. The Pentagon estimates manning the US-Mexican border with troops to cost north of that at around $210 million. Trump has requested $5 billion to construct a concrete wall along the border, with reports estimating a wall would cost more than $70 billion with a yearly maintenance bill around $150 million. The economical option is clear on which policy would be more beneficial not only to the American people, but also those choosing to flee their homes. Maintaining foreign aid to these countries not only provides economic security and outside options to gang activities (and thus potentially diminishes the environments that induce people to flee), it’s also cheaper.