Trumping the Border Wall

There are currently nearly 15,000 immigrant children in the custody of the US government. The recent death of a 7-year-old migrant girl in the custody of US border control has brought the caravan of El Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran migrants heading towards the southern border of the United States back into the headlines. The number of migrants is increasing not only because of new guidelines by the Trump administration where everyone in a sponsor’s household may potentially have to undergo a background check (which significantly slows down the processing of these migrants) but also because of deteriorating conditions in the countries these migrants are fleeing.

Trump, for his part, has threatened to seal the 2,000-mile US-Mexican border in order to stem the flow of migrants. He has already deployed over 5,000 active-duty troops to the border and border authorities have also sprayed tear gas to disperse migrants seeking entry into the US. Trump has also threatened to shut down the federal government if congressional Democrats do not approve $5 billion in funding for a wall. The recent death of 20-year-old college student Mollie Tibbets by undocumented migrant Christhian Bahena Rivera has only galvanized Republican support for a wall. Despite all the hawkish bluster and rhetoric, there may be better policy options if the Trump administration is truly concerned about keeping dangerous people out of the United States.

As I wrote in my previous post, research by Margaret Peters (2014, 2015) suggests that dual policies of closed trade and closed borders are not mutually sustainable – one has to give. The majority of the people in these caravans are fleeing both violence and extreme poverty – these are not mutually exclusive phenomena.

Research from Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan (2016) shows that when given the opportunity to engage in legitimate income-generating sectors of the economy, former fighters in Liberia invested more of their time in doing so and less of their time in illicit activities. These licit economic opportunities also reduced interest in seeking employment as a mercenary in ongoing conflict nearby. In other words, Blattman and Annan empirically show that increases in economic opportunities decrease violence.

Eli Berman, Jacob Shapiro, and Joseph Felter (2011) provide similar research. They show that US reconstruction funds in Iraq allocated through the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) reduce violence and has a more significant effect for smaller projects.

What does this have to do with the price of tea in China? The 2018 Fragile States Index rates El Salvador and Honduras with elevated warnings for becoming fragile or failed and Guatemala with a high warning for becoming fragile or failed. This is relevant because an overwhelming number of people in the caravan are fleeing poverty and gang violence. Research from Oriana Bandiera (2003) and Diego Gambetta (1993) suggests that the rise of the Sicilian Mafia came about partially in response to the inability of a weak state to govern. It’s not a stretch to suggest that gang activity is more prominent in areas where there is also a weak state presence with limited economic prospects.

Part of Trump’s solution to the migrant caravan is to cut off aid to the sending states. According to the US Global Leadership Coalition, US aid to these countries have resulted in lifting 68,000 people out of extreme poverty in Honduras, created 20,000 jobs in Guatemala’s agriculture sector, and granted access to electricity for more than 33,000 households in El Salvador. As research referenced above indicates, the presence of economic opportunities can enhance safety and security. Removing these economic programs, particularly in weak states, will in all likelihood exacerbate the situation these migrants are fleeing from and result in an even more massive influx of people along the US-Mexican border. Sanctioning these states by cutting off aid, therefore, will simply make matters worse – not better.

In her book The Taming of Democracy Assistance: Why Democracy Promotion Does Not Confront Dictators, Sarah Bush notes that democracy assistance programs typically advance programs that don’t attempt to change the status quo per se, but rather focus on improving local governance. While her analysis focuses on explaining this phenomenon, her insight is useful in this context as well. If the Trump administration is genuinely concerned about the number of migrants fleeing poverty and violence from El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, the solution isn’t to cut off aid. US policy of the 1990s of deporting violent criminals to central and Latin America essentially exported and expanded MS-13 and Barrio 18, the gangs responsible for large portions of the violence people in the caravan are fleeing to these countries. A more practical solution would be to continue aid, particularly to organizations engaging in smaller, localized development projects as evidence from Iraq indicates that smaller investment projects have a more substantial effect of reducing violence.

The United States has spent roughly $200 million in foreign aid to El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala this year. The Pentagon estimates manning the US-Mexican border with troops to cost north of that at around $210 million. Trump has requested $5 billion to construct a concrete wall along the border, with reports estimating a wall would cost more than $70 billion with a yearly maintenance bill around $150 million. The economical option is clear on which policy would be more beneficial not only to the American people, but also those choosing to flee their homes. Maintaining foreign aid to these countries not only provides economic security and outside options to gang activities (and thus potentially diminishes the environments that induce people to flee), it’s also cheaper.